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Dehumanization is the term used to describe the process of denying humanity to 
others. The alleviation of dehumanization involves increasing the humanity we attribute to 
dehumanized others, and can be thought of as rehumanization. A large body of work on 
dehumanization has emerged in the last decade, however, little is known about 
rehumanization. The present work contributes to this literature by examining how knowledge 
of intergroup helping in the context of a natural disaster increases or decreases 
rehumanization of outgroups. I had American participants read a news article describing 
either an ingroup or an outgroup natural disaster and that country receiving various amounts 
of international aid. Half the participants were provided with information about hurricane 
Katrina (a national disaster) and varying amounts of aid (none vs. small vs. large) given to 
American victims by Pakistanis. The other half of the participants read about the 2010 
Pakistan floods (a foreign disaster) and varying amounts of aid (none vs. small vs. large) 
given to Pakistani victims by Americans. Results revealed that Americans who read about 
hurricane Katrina and no mention of American victims receiving help, infrahumanized both 
Americans and Pakistanis. However, those participants who went on to read about American 
victims receiving (small or large) help from Pakistanis, attributed significantly more 
secondary emotions to Pakistanis, but not Americans (e.g. ingroup infrahumanization 
persisted). American participants who read about the 2010 Pakistan floods and no mention of 
Pakistani victims receiving help infrahumanized Pakistanis but not Americans. Those 
participants who went on to read about Pakistani victims receiving (small or large) help from 
Americans did not show any change in secondary emotions attributed to either Americans or 
Pakistani’s (e.g. outgroup infrahumanization and ingroup humanization persisted).The 






Dehumanization is the term used to describe denying humanity to others. It has been 
called a perceptual conundrum, for perceiving someone who is human, as though they are 
not, is fundamentally inaccurate (Gervais, Bernard, Klein, & Allen, 2013). The alleviation of 
such a dehumanizing perception can therefore be thought of as a recalibration of perception 
and has been termed, rehumanization. Understanding the factors which influence how we 
attribute (humanization) and deny (dehumanization) humanity to others is an important field 
of enquiry for social psychologists because of the relationship between mind attribution and 
morality: Those we perceive to have a more complex mind are deemed more worthy of moral 
concern, whilst those we perceive to possess a lesser mind are afforded less moral concern.  
However, the inverse is also true, we tend to perceive those whom we treat well as possessing 
humanity and we tend to perceive those whom we do not treat so well as lacking humanity. 
A large body of work on dehumanization has emerged in the last decade, however, 
little is known about rehumanization. The current work adds to the small, but growing 
literature on rehumanization by examining one way to alleviate dehumanization – by making 
intergroup helping (Saguy et al., 2015) salient after a natural disaster. I hypothesize that news 
of a previously dehumanized social outgroup helping the ingroup following a natural disaster, 
would lead to participants to attribute more humanity to the outgroup as an explanation for 
the outgroup’s act of kindness. Moreover, I hypothesize that the humanity attributed to the 
outgroup would not be related to the amount of help given, in that even a token amount of 
help would lead participants to attribute more humanity to the outgroup. In addition, I 
hypothesize that news of the ingroup helping a previously dehumanized outgroup would also 
lead to more humanity attributed to the outgroup, and that the effect would be moderated by 
the amount of help given, in accordance with effort justification theory (Aronson & Mills, 





lead to greater humanization of the outgroup; this effect will be especially strong when the 
ingroup gives lots of help to the outgroup compared to when only a token amount of 
assistance is offered. 
I begin here by outlining Haslam’s (2006) dual model of dehumanization, which 
describes what is denied to others when they are dehumanized. I then summarize the 
conditions which lead to more dehumanizing perceptions which provides the background to 
the experimental work on rehumanization.  
Two types of Dehumanization 
Haslam’s (2006) model of dehumanization highlights two qualitatively distinct forms 
of dehumanization, which can manifest in both blatant and subtle ways. The first, mechanistic 
dehumanization involves the denial of human nature (e.g. sentience), whereas the second, 
animalistic dehumanization, involves the denial of uniquely human characteristics (e.g. 
characteristics which differentiate us from other species; Haslam, 2006). 
Mechanistic Dehumanization. Mechanistic dehumanization represents a denial of 
human nature (sentience) or the comparison of a sentient being to an inanimate object 
(Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Sexualised women and objectified non-human animals are 
prime examples of the malleability of the type of targets who are subject to mechanistic 
dehumanization (Haslam, 2006; Heflick & Goldenberg, 2014; Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & 
Radke, 2012). While mechanistic dehumanization can involve the blatant denial of human 
nature toward a target or group, at the other end of the spectrum lay subtler and sometimes 
unconscious biases which are not always associated with prejudice (Waytz & Schroeder, 
2014). For example, Caucasian Australians were found to possess implicit association 
between Asians and robots (Bain, Park, Kwok, & Haslam, 2009; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). 
Animalistic Dehumanization. In comparison to the denial of sentience associated 





uniquely human (HU) attributes – that which distinguishes us from animals – or the likening 
of humans to animals (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Nazi Germans’ perception of Jews as 
vermin is an example of blatant dehumanization that was used to remove moral concern for 
Jews during World War II (Waytz & Schroeder, 2014).  
A subtle form of animalistic dehumanization, however, can be measured in terms of 
secondary emotions prescribed to an outgroup, relative to one’s in-group, and constitutes 
infrahumanization (Bain, Park, Kwok, & Haslam, 2009; Leyens, et al., 2000). Secondary 
emotions are those identified as uniquely exhibited by humans. Secondary emotions include 
remorse, forgiveness, shame, and guilt - these are contrasted with primary emotions which 
many animals experience, such as pleasure and pain (Demoulin, et al., 2004). 
Infrahumanization presupposes the idea that some humans can be deemed less human than 
others and is evident when higher level of secondary emotions are attributed to one’s ingroup 
relative to the outgroup (Leyens, et al., 2000) or when higher levels of primary emotions are 
associated with an outgroup over the ingroup (Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & 
Leyens, 2009). In addition, infrahumanization has been measured independently of ingroup 
emotions, by solely measuring outgroup secondary emotions (Albarello & Rubini, 2012) or 
outgroup secondary emotions relative to outgroup primary emotions (Vezalli, Capozza, Stathi 
& Giovannini, 2012). Taken together, infrahumanization is an intergroup phenomenon in that 
the attribution of more secondary than primary emotions to the ingroup can be thought of as 
ingroup favouritism; while the denial of secondary emotions to outgroups represents 
outgroup bias. 
Though animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization are qualitatively different, 
neuro-imaging studies show that they are not mutually exclusive. For example, in one study 
using fMRI, Harris and Fiske (2006) showed that drug addicts and the homeless, who are 





animalistic dehumanization (see also Fiske, 2009; 2013). After having participants view 
images of various social groups and objects, they found that social groups which elicit both 
types of dehumanization elicit less activation of the mPFC (medial prefrontal cortex), a 
region in the brain where activation tends to indicate social cognition, relative to exposure to 
other social groups who elicit only one type of dehumanization (e.g., animalistic or 
mechanistic) or neither. Such low activation of the mPFC was similar to activation occurring 
when people viewed non-social stimuli (Harris & Fiske, 2006). 
While sometimes people may simultaneously exhibit animalistic and mechanistic 
dehumanization, at other times, people may only one or the other. For example, people may 
show animalistic, but not mechanistic dehumanization of Blacks in the US (e.g., Goff, 
Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008) or mechanistic, but not animalistic dehumanization 
toward Asians in Australia (e.g., Bain et al., 2009). In a series of studies, Goff and colleagues 
(2008) highlighted that Americans implicitly associated Blacks with apes (e.g., animalistic 
dehumanization). In an archival study of actual criminal cases, the same authors revealed that 
news articles written about Blacks who receive capital punishment were more likely to 
contain ape-relevant language. In three cross-cultural studies, Bain, Park, Kwok, and Haslam, 
(2009) showed how people can show animalistic, but not mechanistic dehumanization, and 
also mechanistic but not animalistic dehumanization towards an outgroup. Specifically, 
Australian participants showed subtle mechanistic (but not animalistic) dehumanization of 
Chinese. Conversely, Chinese participants showed subtle animalistic (but not mechanistic) 
dehumanization of Australians. Taken together, what is clear is that both types of 
dehumanizing perceptions involve the denial of humanity; animalistic and mechanistic 
dehumanization both involve perceiving or treating someone who is human, as though they 





Classifying a group (or individual) outside of humanity is concerning because of the 
relationship between dehumanization and morality. Historically, dehumanization has been 
used to remove moral concern and justify atrocious intergroup behaviour, including the Nazi 
comparison of Jews to vermin during the holocaust and the comparison of the Tutsis to 
cockroaches in the Rwandan genocide (Opotow, 1990). More recently, numerous works have 
shown a negative relationship between dehumanization and the moral concern we have for 
various social groups in everyday life, including women (Loughnan, et al., 2010), ethnic 
outgroups (Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007), lower socio-economic classes (Loughnan, 
Haslam, Sutton, & Spencer, 2014), and the homeless (Harris, & Fiske, 2006). In essence, 
when someone or a group dehumanizes others, they are calibrating their moral compass in 
order to remove the constraints of morality. The opposite process of rehumanization could 
then be thought of as a realignment, or recalibration, of one’s (distorted) moral compass. 
Indeed, in reviewing the limited literature on rehumanization, each empirical study has 
focused on encouraging participants to more accurately consider those capacities that are 
denied in the dehumanization process. 
What’s more, dehumanization ranges on a spectrum of blatancy from an overt 
categorical denial of humanness (as seen in genocide) to a subtle denial of the emotions 
associated with humanity (e.g. as measured by infrahumanization). As such, rehumanization 
studies have also employed various levels of blatancy in their work.  
Rehumanization 
All of the experimental studies on rehumanization to date have involved providing 
information to participants which, in one way or another, challenges dehumanizing 
perceptions. Challenging information has included providing participants with: (1) complex 





concerning intergroup relations. I now briefly review each of these three areas, which 
provided the rationale for the current work. 
Complex Information Surrounding the Target. Three empirical studies have 
alleviated dehumanization by providing participants with complex information surrounding 
the target. For example, Albarello and Rubini (2012) experimentally reduced Italians’ 
infrahumanization of Black immigrants by describing Blacks as complex (e.g., with a 
superordinate human identity alongside multiple other identities) rather than simple 
(comparing blacks to whites, in a dichotomous fashion). The authors suggest that describing 
dehumanized targets in a complex manner leads participants to attribute a more complex 
mind to the dehumanized target (Albarello & Rubini, 2012).  
Awareness of common humanity, however, is not without its downfalls. Human 
identity has also been associated with reduced empathy and greater expectation of 
forgiveness following intergroup conflict (Greenaway, Louis, & Wohl, 2012) and excusing 
aggressive behaviour as “only human” (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014, p. 417). Prati, Vasiljevic, 
Crisp, & Rubini (2015) extended upon the limitations of priming common humanity by 
showing that thinking of a female in a counterstereotypic way can vicariously reduce 
dehumanization of a stigmatized third-party outgroup. Prati, Vasiljevic, Crisp, & Rubini 
(2015) had participants form an impression of a counterstereotypic female (i.e. a female 
mechanic) and then produce a list of adjectives to describe the target. The results showed that 
participants attributed more complex emotions to stigmatized outgroups (e.g. asylum seekers) 
after thinking of a counter stereotypical women versus a stereotypical women. Mediation 
analyses showed the effect was driven by a reduction in heuristic thinking. This study shows 
how untangling peoples stereotyped perceptions of others can lead to less dehumanization of 





The next two studies focussed on alleviating the dehumanization of sexualized 
women, as opposed to a third party. Specifically, Bernard and colleagues (2015) showed that 
providing humanizing information (versus no information) alongside pictures of a sexualized 
woman (in a sexy calendar), lead participants to see those women (pictured in the calendar) in 
a more human-like manner. The humanizing information surrounded the targets’ warmth and 
competence. The dependent variable of interest was the type of processing which reflects 
whether participants perceive the target in a human-like (i.e. configurally) or object-like 
(analytically; indicative of mechanistic dehumanization) manner. The authors discuss their 
findings in light of the promise that drawing attention towards the internal states of women 
may have for alleviating dehumanizing perceptions of women. 
Information about the Perceiver. Civile and Obhi (2015) reduced the 
dehumanization of sexualized women by manipulating the hierarchical thinking which is 
associated with dehumanization. Specifically, Civile and Obhi (2015) primed men and 
women with feelings of low versus high power and examined the participant’s perception of 
sexualized women. The authors found that inducing female and male participants with 
feelings of low power (relative to high power), lead both women and men to perceive 
sexualized women in a more human-like way. This finding suggests that not only does how 
we perceive others influence whether we attribute them humanity, but perhaps just as 
importantly, how we perceive ourselves plays a role in reattributing humanity to others. 
Notably, the previous two studies (Bernard, et al., 2015; Civile & Obhi, 2015) are the first of 
their kind to alleviate the dehumanizing perception of women that is associated with sexual 
objectification (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). 
Intergroup Relations. Just as perceptions of the self and others have informed 
rehumanization strategies, positive intergroup relations between one’s ingroup and outgroups 





prosocial intergroup contact increased Italian children’s attribution of secondary emotions 
towards immigrants (Vezzali, Capozza, Stahi, & Giovannini, 2012). The children were 
instructed to imagine interacting with an immigrant child and think about what nice things the 
participant could say to the immigrant child to become friends together. Interestingly, the 
impact of their study was maintained for a week after the manipulation and highlights how 
even imagining positive intergroup relations with outgroup members can alleviate 
dehumanization of immigrants. 
Historically, dehumanization has been used to remove moral concern and justify 
atrocious intergroup behaviour. People often dehumanize others to justify the ingroup’s 
mistreatment of the outgroup (Bandura 2002; Opotow 1990; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006), 
or to justify failing to help the outgroup in times of need (e.g., following a natural disaster: 
Andrighetto, Baldissarri, Lattanzio, Loughnan, & Volpato, 2014; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 
2007). Following this rationale, Saguy and colleagues (2015) theorized that people would 
rehumanize an outgroup if reminded of a time when the ingroup helped the outgroup. Saguy 
and colleagues (2015) found evidence for this hypothesis in a field experiment in war-torn 
Israel. The authors had Israeli participants read a short story about Israeli doctors (ingroup 
members) volunteering to help Palestinian children (outgroup members) in the Gaza strip, an 
area of ongoing battle between the two groups. Relative to controls, participants who read 
about the ingroup helping the outgroup showed a decrease in dehumanization of the 
outgroup. 
Additional research demonstrates that knowledge of an outgroup helping a third party 
may also reduce dehumanization of the outgroup that offered assistance (Delgado, Betancor, 
Rodríguez-Pérez, & Ariño, 2012). In an experimental study, these authors had Spanish 





a control condition, participants who read about Somalians prosocial behaviour attributed 
more secondary emotions to the outgroup. 
Current Research 
Drawing on these previous studies, I tested whether knowledge of the outgroup 
helping the ingroup would also influence blatant and subtle dehumanization. I also aimed to 
replicate Saguy and colleagues’ (2015) work to examine whether knowledge of ingroup 
helping the outgroup influences blatant and subtle dehumanization with American 
participants in a non-violent intergroup context. Moreover, I also wished to examine whether 
these effects would further depend on whether the amount of help being offered is big or 
small. Previous research suggests that people experience greater attitude change as a function 
of the amount of effort expended (i.e., effort justification; Aronson & Mills, 1959). In the 
context of the present research, this may imply that participants exhibit more rehumanization 
of an outgroup if Americans helped at a greater cost to themselves, compared to when the 
help is more minimal. However, when the outgroup offers assistance to the ingroup following 
a natural disaster, it would highlight the outgroup’s humanity and reduce dehumanization 
regardless of the cost to the outgroup. As previous rehumanization studies have varied in the 
blatancy of dehumanization they have measured, I used both subtle (attributions of primary 
and secondary emotions) and blatant measures of animalistic dehumanization. Alleviation of 
infrahumanization has previously been shown via an increase in secondary emotions 
attributed to the outgroup. Moreover, as previous research on rehumanization has not 
examined ingroup emotions following rehumanization strategies, I measured both outgroup 
and ingroup, secondary and primary emotions, however, I did not have any pre-planned 
hypotheses surrounding attributions of emotions to the ingroup. 
The current research tested these hypotheses with an American sample by (1) 





following hurricane Katrina (an American natural disaster); or (2) by highlighting various 
amounts of aid (none vs. small vs. large) given by Americans to Pakistan following the 2010 
Pakistani floods (a Pakistani natural disaster).  
My hypotheses were therefore that (1) news of Pakistan helping America (regardless 
of amount of aid provided) following hurricane Katrina, compared to news of the disaster 
alone, would lead to rehumanization of Pakistanis; (2) news of America helping Pakistan 
following the 2010 Pakistan floods would lead to rehumanization of Pakistanis in proportion 
to the amount that the ingroup helped, such that Pakistanis would be rehumanized to a greater 
extent when the US offered a more significant amount of aid and support relative to less. I did 
not have specific hypotheses for which measures would show rehumanization, however, 
alleviation of infrahumanization (subtle dehumanization) would be evident via an increase in 
the secondary emotions attributed to the outgroup. 
Pilot study 
A pilot study was first used to identify the ideal target outgroup for the main study. 
The outgroup that was to be used in the main study needed to meet the following criteria. 
Firstly, the outgroup had to have a baseline level of dehumanization by Americans. Secondly, 
the outgroup had to have reciprocal international aid with America following a natural 
disaster. Specifically, the outgroup had to of publically offered help to the USA following a 
recent natural disaster in America. Similarly, America had to of publically offered help to the 
outgroup following a recent outgroup natural disaster. Lastly, these two disasters had to be 
equivalent in terms of fatalities and impact on the country. 
Participants 
I used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk’s online marketplace to recruit participants for our 
pilot study. The participants were 142 people from the USA (77 male, 65 female). The 





American, 4% Native American (1% identified as ‘other’). 57% identified as Christian, 14% 
identified with ‘other religion’ and 29% identified with no religion. An attention check was 
used to examine the level of attention participants paid during the experiment. This question 
asked participants to simply move a slider from 0 to 100. Together, 14 participants were 
removed from analyses because they failed to answer the attention check or were not US 
citizens, leaving 128 American citizens. To reduce the amount of time taken to complete the 
study, I randomly assigned participants to complete measures relating to only one half the 
outgroups on the list or the other half. 
Measures 
Animalistic dehumanization. A 4-item measure taken from Leidner, Castano, Zaiser 
and Giner-Sorolla (2010) assessed participants’ animalistic dehumanization of various 
groups. Participants were instructed to indicate how much they agreed with the following 
statements about each social group. A sample question from the scale is “Some aspects of 
XXX life are typical of a backward culture". Participants answered each question using a 
scale anchored from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), where lower numbers 
indicate greater blatant animalistic dehumanization. For each social group, the four items 
were added together to create a composite score of animalistic dehumanization. Each scale 
had good internal validity ( > .70). For a full copy of the measure, please refer to Appendix 
B. A second animalistic dehumanization measure was also taken directly from previous work 
(Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). Participants were presented with a single figure 
depicting different stages of human evolution. Participants were instructed to indicate from 1 
to 100 how evolved they thought various groups were. A score of 100 indicates the target is 
fully evolved whereas a score of anything below suggests a level of dehumanization. Please 





Mechanistic dehumanization. A 4-item measure taken from Bastian and Haslam 
(2010) assessed participants’ blatant mechanistic dehumanization of various groups. 
Participants were instructed to indicate how much they agreed with the following statements 
about each social group. A sample question from the scale is “XXX are open-minded and can 
think clearly". Participants answered each question using a scale anchored from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), where lower numbers indicate greater mechanistic 
dehumanization. For each social group, the four items were added together to create a 
composite score of blatant mechanistic dehumanization. Each scale had good internal validity 
( > .70). For a full copy of the measure, please refer to Appendix B.  
Results 
Because our participants only answered dehumanization for half of the target groups, 
we computed separate repeated measures ANOVAs on each variable for both groups of 
participants.  
Animalistic dehumanization. Using the first half of the participants, a repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed a significant difference in the animalistic dehumanization of 
various groups, F(1, 62)  = 13.01,  p < .001 (see Table 1). Similarly, using the second half of 
the participants, a repeated-measures ANOVA also revealed a significant difference in the 
animalistic dehumanization of various groups, F(1, 61) = 10.96 , p < .001 (see Table 1). 
Looking at another blatant measure of animalistic dehumanization, and using the first 
half of the participants, a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant difference in the 
ascent dehumanization of various groups, F(1, 62) = 11.53 , p < .001 (see Table 1). Again, 
using the second half of the participants, a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant 






 Mechanistic dehumanization. A repeated-measures ANOVA using the first half of 
participants revealed a significant difference in the mechanistic dehumanization of various 
groups, F(1, 57)  = 14.80, p < .001 (see Table 1). A repeated-measures ANOVA using the 
second half of participants also revealed a significant difference in the mechanistic 
dehumanization of various groups, F(1, 54) = 12.19, p < .001 (see Table 1).  
Table 1.  
 
Means and standard deviations for animalistic, mechanistic and ascent dehumanization of various 
groups where lower numbers equal more dehumanization. 








America 5.11 (1.08)* 95.33 (8.57)* 5.13 (.99)* 
Mexico 4.31 (1.05) 88.24 (17.25) 4.96 (.82) 
Indonesia 4.38 (1.04) 87.02 (19.79) 4.86 (.86) 
Djibouti 4.15 (1.16) 84.86 (21.16) 4.66 (.96) 
Jordan 4.42 (1.10) 86.66 (20.02) 4.68 (1.00) 
Muslims 4.22 (1.24) 82.46 (26.29) 4.19 (1.32) 
America ^ 4.71 (1.02) 87.41 (16.80) 4.96 (.98) 
Haiti 4.06 (.94) 72.19 (27.57) 4.77 (1.11) 
Thailand 4.43 (1.05) 76.23 (22.48) 4.84 (.90) 
Kenya 3.85 (1.12) 73.16 (24.80) 4.50 (1.28) 
Pakistan 3.85 (1.17)** 70.06 (28.30)** 4.19 (1.17)** 
Muslims ^ 3.98 (1.12) 71.56 (28.60) 4.20 (1.08) 
Note: ^ Each participant was asked about American, Muslims and four ethnic outgroups, 
consequently, Americans and Muslims appear twice. ** Indicates greatest level of dehumanization 






I chose to use Pakistan as the outgroup for our main study because it was the best fit 
for our criteria. Firstly, Pakistan received the most dehumanization from American 
participants. Pakistan was also an ideal outgroup because America and Pakistan publically 
offered a similar amount of aid (relative to GDP) to each other following their recent natural 
disasters.  
Main Study 
Using Pakistan as the outgroup of choice for the study, I wished to examine how 
knowledge of aid offered in response to an American or Pakistani natural disaster would 
impact blatant and subtle dehumanization of Pakistanis and Americans. To do this, I chose a 
natural disaster that took place in the USA or Pakistan in recent history. This was chosen to 
be similar in terms of both loss of life and economic impact. The corresponding natural 
disasters were Hurricane Katrina, a destructive hurricane that swept the south coast of the 
United States, and the 2010 flooding in Pakistan, which occurred after severe monsoon rains 
and lead to extensive flooding. The number of fatalities for both disasters was similar 
(approx. 2000) and both had similar levels of economic impact with respect to the nation’s 
GDP. I chose to only measure animalistic dehumanization in the main study because 
participants showed greater animalistic dehumanization of Pakistanis compared to 
mechanistic dehumanization in the pilot study. However, I chose to use three types of 
animalistic dehumanization measures with varying levels of blatancy. These included two 
blatant measures and one subtle measure (infrahumanization). 
Method 
Participants  
A total of 318 participants completed the study. Of these participants, 55 participants 
were removed from analyses because they either were not US citizens, or failed a very basic 





unidentified). The manipulation check used here was a basic one that simply asked 
participants to complete a multiple-choice question on which country the natural disaster they 
read about took place in. Participants who could not answer this very basic question correctly 
had clearly not read the manipulation at all. Participants were recruited from mechanical Turk 
and were given US$2 in return for their participation. Participants included 211 White 
Americans, 13 Black Americans, 13 Asian Americans, 11 Latino Americans, 10 Native 
Americans (9 participants described their ethnicity as ‘mixed’ or ‘other’). Participants ranged 
in age from 17 to 74 years (M = 36.65, SD = 12.93).  
Manipulations 
 Participants read one of six manipulations which were adapted from recent work 
alleviating dehumanization (Saguy, et al., 2015). I used news stories that were based on 
actual events to manipulate the direction of help (ingroup to outgroup vs. outgroup to 
ingroup) and the amount of aid given (no aid vs. small amount of aid vs. large amount of aid).  
Ingroup Disaster. Half of the participant’s manipulation opened with a paragraph on 
hurricane Katrina (an ingroup disaster) and the impact it had on Americans (the ingroup). In 
the control condition, the text ended after this paragraph. 
In the small and large aid conditions, participants read an additional paragraph about 
Pakistan (the outgroup) donating either a small or a large amount of aid to the victims of 
hurricane Katrina (the ingroup). I operationalized the amount of aid as the amount of doctors 
who offered their help and also the amount of money that was offered from everyday citizens 
and the governments of the country responding to the disaster. The two manipulations were 
carefully written to be similar in order to avoid potential confounds (see Appendix A). Small 
and large aid conditions differed in terms of the number of doctors who volunteered (6 vs. 





country’s humanitarian budget), and the amount of money donated by average citizens 
($50,000 vs. $500,000).  
Outgroup disaster. The remaining half of the participants read about the 2010 
Pakistan floods (an outgroup disaster) and the impact it had on Pakistanis (the outgroup). In 
the control condition, the text ended after this paragraph. However, in the low and high aid 
conditions, participants read an additional paragraph about America (the ingroup) donating 
either a small or a large amount of aid to the victims of the Pakistan floods (the outgroup). I 
operationalized the amount of aid exactly the same as the ingroup disaster (see above), except 
for the amount of money offered which was adjusted for GDP (see Appendix A). 
Measures  
Infrahumanization. Adapted from previous work, participants were asked various questions 
about the kinds of emotions they thought both Pakistanis and Americans would have felt 
following the disaster they read about. Similar to previous research (e.g. Cuddy et al; 2007), 
participants completed seven items relating to negative secondary emotions (grief, sorrow, 
mourning, anguish, guilt, remorse, resentment) and seven relating to negative primary 
emotions (confusion, pain, distress, fear, panic, anger, rage). I only measured negative 
emotions due to the context of our manipulation which involved a fatal natural disaster 
(Cuddy et al., 2007). Responses were anchored from 1 (Not At All) to 5 (Extremely). I created 
four subscales to examine infrahumanization: these were for Pakistani primary emotions (= 
.92), Pakistani secondary emotions (= .86), American primary emotions (= .90), and 
American secondary emotions (= .85), similar to what has been done in past 
rehumanization work (Albarello & Rubini, 2010; Vezzali, Capozza, Stathi & Giovannini, 
2012). 
Animalistic Dehumanization. To assess participants’ blatant animalistic 





and colleagues (2010). Participants were instructed to “indicate how much they agreed with 
the following statements regarding Pakistanis”. A sample question from the scale is “Some 
aspects of Pakistani life are typical of a backward culture". Participants answered each 
question using a scale anchored from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), where 
higher numbers indicate greater blatant animalistic dehumanization. The eight items had good 
internal validity ( = .86). For a full copy of the measure, please refer to Appendix B.  
Ascent Dehumanization. The second blatant dehumanization scale was also taken 
directly from previous work (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). Participants were 
presented with a single figure depicting different stages of human evolution. Participants 
were instructed to indicate from 1 to 100 how developed they thought Americans and 
Pakistanis are (higher numbers indicate more humanness). In addition, similar to previous 
work (Kteily et al., 2015), a measure of ascent dehumanization of Pakistanis relative to the 
ascent dehumanization of Americans was computed. A score of zero indicates that 
participants see both groups as equally evolved, whereas a score of anything above zero 
indicates blatant outgroup dehumanization. Please refer to Appendix C for a copy of the 
figure used.  
Procedure  
Participants completed the study under the guise of a study looking at the difference 
in memory performance following exposure to a natural versus human-made disaster. All 
participants were given informed consent, and the right to withdraw their consent was made 
clear. Participants first answered general demographic questions and completed a filler task 
where they had to complete words from a list of scrambled letters. Participants were then 
randomly assigned to one of six conditions and read the corresponding manipulation. 
Participants then answered the infrahumanization measure, a manipulation check, the 





were thanked for their time, given US$2 and a debrief acknowledging the true nature of the 
study. 
Design 
The study employed a 2 (country of disaster: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 3 (amount of 
aid: no aid vs. small aid vs. large aid) between-subjects design. The two factors were 
direction of aid (outgroup to ingroup vs. ingroup to outgroup) and amount of aid given 
(control vs. small vs. large). 
Results 
Data Screening 
There were no single outliers, however, graphing the data showed there were ceiling 
and floor effects for ascent dehumanization of both Americans (skewness = -3.04, SE =.15; 
kurtosis = 11.70, SE = .30) and Pakistanis (skewness = -1.93, SE =.15; kurtosis = 3.42, SE = 
.30). However, given adequate sample size, this was not deemed to be an issue (Field, 2013). 
Limitations of the non-normal distribution of the data and directions for future sampling 
methods are discussed on page 32 of the limitations section in the discussion. 
Please see Appendix D for the means, standard deviations and significance tests of 
infrahumanization and blatant dehumanization for all conditions. 
Infrahumanization 
A 2 (disaster origin: hurricane Katrina vs. Pakistan floods) x 3 (amount of aid: control 
vs. low aid vs. high aid) x 2 (emotion type: secondary vs. primary) x 2 (target: outgroup vs. 
ingroup) mixed-model ANOVA, where emotion type and target were within subjects factors, 
highlighted that all infrahumanization effects were qualified by a significant 4-way 
interaction, F(2, 288) = 3.58, p =.03, ηp
2
 =.02.  
Ingroup Disaster. To deconstruct the 4-way interaction, I began by computing a 3 





floods. Looking specifically at those participants in the hurricane Katrina condition, a 3 
(amount of aid: control vs. low aid vs. high aid) x 2 (emotion type: secondary vs. primary) x 
2 (target: outgroup vs. ingroup) mixed-model ANOVA, where emotion type and target were 
within subjects factors,  revealed a significant 3-way interaction, F(2, 121) = 4.57, p =.01, ηp
2  
= .07. 
Next, I broke the 3 way interaction down to examine attributions of secondary and 
primary emotions attributed to the outgroup following reading about hurricane Katrina. A 3 
(amount of aid: control vs. low aid vs. high aid) x 2 (emotion type: secondary vs. primary) 
mixed-model ANOVA, where emotion type was the within subjects factor revealed a 
significant interaction between amount of aid and outgroup emotion type, F(2, 121) = 12.37, 
p < .001, ηp
2 
= .17.  
A factorial ANOVA revealed that for those participants who read about hurricane 
Katrina, there was a significant difference in the secondary emotions attributed to Pakistanis 
between the amount of aid factor, F(2, 121) = 4.03, p =.02. Post-hoc tests using Sidak 
adjustments for multiple comparisons revealed that participants who read that Pakistanis 
provided a small (M = 2.70, SD = .86) or large (M = 2.67, SD = .76) amount of aid to the 
victims of hurricane Katrina attributed significantly more secondary emotions to Pakistanis, 
than did participants who read about hurricane Katrina and no mention of aid (M = 2.23, SD 
= .93) (see Figure 1). There was no difference in the attribution of secondary emotions to 
Pakistanis regardless of whether they read that Pakistan gave a small (M = 2.70, SD = .86) or 
large (M = 2.67, SD = .76) amount of aid.  
A factorial ANOVA revealed that for those participants who read about hurricane 
Katrina, there was no significant difference in the primary emotions attributed to Pakistanis 
between the amount of aid factor, F(2, 121) = .60, p =.55. Please see Figure 1 below for a 







Figure 1. Shows the alleviation of infrahumanization (increased secondary emotions) following news 
of Pakistan sending either low and high aid to America. 
 
I next examined the attributions of secondary and primary emotions to the ingroup 
after reading about hurricane Katrina. A 3 (amount of aid: control vs. small aid vs. high aid) x 
2 (emotion type: secondary vs. primary) mixed-model ANOVA, where emotion type was the 
within subjects factor revealed there was no interaction between amount of aid and ingroup 
emotion type, F(2, 121) = 1.16, p = .32. Though I did not have specific pre-planned 
hypotheses surrounding attributions of emotions, American participants who read about 
hurricane Katrina did not attribute more secondary than  primary emotions to the ingroup, 


















Figure 2. Shows ingroup infrahumanization (no differentiation between secondary and primary 
emotions). 
 
Outgroup Disaster. Next I computed a 3 way interaction for participants who read 
about the Pakistan floods. Looking specifically at those participants in the Pakistan floods 
condition, a 3 (amount of aid: control vs. small aid vs. high aid) x 2 (emotion type: secondary 
vs. primary) x 2 (target: outgroup vs. ingroup) mixed-model ANOVA, where emotion type 
and target were within subjects factors, showed that the 3-way interaction was not significant, 
F(2, 136) = 5.82, p =.56. 
A factorial ANOVA confirmed that for those participants who read about the Pakistan 
floods, there was no difference in the secondary emotions attributed to Pakistanis between the 
amount of aid factor, F(2, 136) = .61, p =.55. A second factorial ANOVA confirmed that for 
those participants who read about the Pakistan floods, there was no difference in the primary 
emotions attributed to Pakistanis between the amount of aid factor, F(2, 136) = .57, p =.57. 
















Figure 3. Shows the perpetuation of infrahumanization following news of the Pakistan floods 
irrespective of aid being given. 
 
In the 3 way interaction output, there was a significant emotion by target interaction, 
F(1, 136) = 91.10, p <.001, ηp
2 
=.40. Though I did not have pre-planned hypotheses 
surrounding attributions of emotions to the ingroup, a 3 (amount of aid: control vs. small aid 
vs. high aid) x 2 (emotion type: secondary vs. primary) mixed-model ANOVA, where 
emotion type was the within subjects factor, revealed that, regardless of the level of aid, there 
was significantly more secondary compared to primary emotions attributed to the ingroup, 
F(1, 136) = 83.78, p <.001, ηp
2 
=.38. Please see Figure 4 below for a graph of the means. 
 
Figure 4. Shows classic ingroup bias associated with infrahumanization (i.e. more secondary 



























A 2 (disaster origin: hurricane Katrina vs. Pakistan floods) x 3 (amount of aid: control 
vs. small aid vs. large aid) factorial ANOVA found there was no interaction of disaster origin 
and amount of aid on the animalistic dehumanization of Pakistanis, F(1, 257) = .33, p =.72. 
Participants who read about hurricane Katrina with either low (M = 3.61, SD = 1.05) or high 
(M = 3.45, SD = 1.09) aid given by Pakistan did not show significantly less blatant 
dehumanization of Pakistanis than participants who read about hurricane Katrina and no 
mention of aid (M = 3.87, SD = 0.89).  
Similarly, participants who read about the Pakistan floods with either low (M = 3.86, 
SD = 1.08) or high (M = 3.91, SD = 1.13) aid given by America did not show significantly 
less blatant dehumanization of Pakistanis than participants who read about the Pakistan 
floods and no mention of aid (M = 4.09, SD = 1.16). Please see Figure 5 below for a graph of 
the means. 
 
Figure 5. Shows no significant reduction in blatant animalistic dehumanization of Pakistanis. 
 
Ascent Dehumanization 
A 2 (disaster origin: hurricane Katrina vs. Pakistan floods) x 3 (amount of aid: control 
vs. small aid vs large aid) factorial ANOVA found there was no interaction of disaster origin 
and amount of aid on the ascent dehumanization of Pakistanis, F(2, 257) = .32,  p = .73. 
Participants who read about hurricane Katrina with either low (M = 91.53, SD =12.83) or 















ascent dehumanization of Pakistanis relative to Americans than participants who read about 
hurricane Katrina and no mention of aid (M = 88.93, SD =17.58). Similarly, participants who 
read about the Pakistan floods with either low (M =84.78, SD =23.24) or high (M =87.69, SD 
=18.61) aid given by America did not show significantly less blatant ascent dehumanization 
of Pakistanis than participants who read about the Pakistan floods and no mention of aid (M 
=182.69, SD =24.64). 
Similar to previous work (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015), a 2 (disaster 
origin: hurricane Katrina vs. Pakistan floods) x 3 (amount of aid: control vs. small aid vs 
large aid) factorial ANOVA found there was also no interaction of disaster origin and amount 
of aid on the ascent dehumanization of Pakistanis relative to Americans, F(2, 257) = 1.30,  p 
= .27. Participants who read about hurricane Katrina with either low (M = 2.60, SD = 8.91) or 
high (M = 3.66, SD = 22.27) aid given by Pakistan did not show significantly less blatant 
ascent dehumanization of Pakistanis relative to Americans than participants who read about 
hurricane Katrina and no mention of aid (M = 3.65, SD = 14.18). Similarly, participants who 
read about the Pakistan floods with either low (M =8.13, SD =18.40) or high (M =3.20, SD 
=8.97) aid given by America did not show significantly less blatant ascent dehumanization of 
Pakistanis than participants who read about the Pakistan floods and no mention of aid (M 
=10.65, SD =19.02). Please see Figure 6 below for a graph of the means. 
 
Figure 6. Shows no significant reduction in ascent dehumanization of Pakistanis relative to 

















The current research examined whether knowledge of intergroup helping in response 
to a major natural disaster increases the humanity attributed to a previously dehumanized 
outgroup. I hypothesized that news of Pakistan sending aid to the victims of hurricane 
Katrina (an American disaster) would lend itself to American participants perceiving 
Pakistanis in a more human-like fashion regardless of the amount of aid they offered. 
Furthermore, I wished to replicate the findings of Saguy and colleagues (2015) in a context 
that is not conflict-ridden to see whether news of Americans helping Pakistanis would 
increase humanizing perceptions of Pakistanis by American participants. Moreover, I 
predicted that such rehumanization would occur as a function of the amount of aid given by 
the ingroup to the outgroup because of effort justification (Aronson & Mills, 1959).  
Ingroup Disaster. The results supported my primary hypotheses that news of aid 
would alleviate dehumanization. There was a significant reduction in the infrahumanization 
(a subtle measure) of Pakistanis after reading about Pakistan sending aid to the victims of 
Hurricane Katrina, compared to reading about hurricane Katrina with no mention of aid given 
by Pakistan. This effect occurred regardless of whether Pakistan had offered small or large 
amounts of aid to Americans following the disaster. Interestingly, there was no difference in 
the secondary and primary emotions attributed to the ingroup across conditions suggesting 
that receiving aid had an impact on outgroup, but not (subtle) ingroup humanity. Notably, I 
did not find the classic infrahumanization effect of greater secondary  emotions, relative to 
primary emotions, attributed to the ingroup following news of hurricane Katrina, irrespective 
of whether Pakistan gave aid or not. I did not, however, find any significant changes in 





Outgroup Disaster. There was no reduction in the subtle or blatant dehumanization 
of Pakistanis after reading about America sending aid to the victims of the Pakistan floods, 
compared to reading about the Pakistan floods with no mention of aid.  I did, however, 
observe the ingroup bias associated with infrahumanization of greater secondary versus 
primary emotions attributed to the ingroup. 
Theoretical Contribution 
The current work highlights that brief exposure of aid given to Americans (the 
ingroup) from Pakistanis (an outgroup) may simultaneously reduce the outgroup bias and 
ingroup favouritism associated with infrahumanization. The reduction in ingroup favouritism 
I found is evident in that I did not find the classic infrahumanization effect of greater 
secondary  emotions, relative to primary emotions, attributed to the ingroup following news 
of hurricane Katrina (irrespective of whether Pakistan gave aid or not). The current work also 
suggests that news of aid given to Pakistanis (an outgroup) from Americans (the ingroup) 
may not always benefit intergroup relations.  
Ingroup Disaster. 
Rehumanizing the Outgroup. The finding that news of an outgroup helping the 
ingroup can alleviate infrahumanization of the outgroup is consistent with research on the 
relationship between dehumanization and intergroup help. For example, the humanity people 
attribute to others has been shown to impact on their willingness to help an outgroup 
following a natural disaster (Andrighetto, Baldissarri, Lattanzio, Loughnan, & Volpato, 2014; 
Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007). In addition, not only might we help those who we deem have 
a more complex mind, but we may also increase, or decrease the humanity we attribute to 
others to correspond with how the ingroup has treated them (Saguy et al., 2015). Saguy and 
colleagues (2015) experimentally found that news of fellow ingroup members helping an 





outgroup. This finding is in line with Delgado and colleagues (2012) who found that news of 
an outgroup giving aid to a third-party can reduce infrahumanization of the group that helped. 
The authors suggest that prosocial behaviour is a uniquely human act which leads participants 
to attribute uniquely humanity to the group that has given help (Gilbert & Malone, 1995, 
Delgado et al., 2012). 
Following Saguy and colleagues (2015), I hypothesized that news of an outgroup 
helping the ingroup would facilitate participants to align their perceptions of the outgroup 
with the outgroups act of kindness towards the ingroup. Indeed, the current work found 
supporting evidence that news of an outgroup helping the ingroup can foster more humanized 
outgroup perceptions, measured by the attribution of secondary emotions. Our finding of 
alleviating infrahumanization of the outgroup becomes rather interesting when taken with our 
finding that participants who read about hurricane Katrina infrahumanized the ingroup 
regardless of whether Pakistan sent aid or not. What this suggests is that our prime may have 
had an impact on both outgroup and ingroup humanization.  
Infrahumanizing the Ingroup. Though I did not have pre-planned hypotheses for 
attributions of emotions to the ingroup; I found unexpected evidence that Americans 
infrahumanized the ingroup, after reading news of hurricane Katrina, irrespective of whether 
Pakistan sent aid or not. That is, we did not observe the classic infrahumanization effect of a 
greater number of secondary emotions, relative to primary emotions, attributed to the 
ingroup. It may well be that our manipulation lead participants to experience a temporary loss 
of power which may have levelled an intergroup power dynamic (Civile & Obhi, 2015).  
Civile and Obhi (2015) showed that experimentally inducing feelings of low power can lead 
to more humanizing perceptions of dehumanized women (Civile & Obhi, 2015). This 





secondary emotions), and decrease in ingroup favouritism (reduced ingroup secondary 
emotions) after reading about Pakistan sending aid to America.  
However, a second explanation can also describe the ingroup infrahumanization. This 
unexpected finding could be explained alongside the distinction between outgroup derogation 
and ingroup humanization (Vaes, Leyens, Paladino & Miranda, 2012). As humanizing the 
ingroup is moderated by ingroup identification (Demoulin, et al., 2009); infrahumanizing the 
ingroup could perhaps be explained by participants distancing themselves from the ingroup as 
a strategy to save face, when faced with reminders of a controversial ingroup disaster (e.g., 
the Katrina controversy; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007). Considering the nation’s slow 
response to hurricane Katrina, American participants’ infrahumanization of fellow 
Americans, following news of hurricane Katrina, could represent collective guilt over the 
nation’s failure to respond in a timely manner. In this way, (at least temporarily) 
infrahumanizing the ingroup may have alleviated guilt by discounting the victims’ of 
hurricane Katrina’s capacity to suffer. Notably, I did not ask participants about the victims 
suffering, but rather national suffering after the disaster. Future work could examine this 
explanation in two ways. Collective guilt could be measured using the same paradigm and the 
addition of a mediation analysis to examine the role of guilt can be explored. Alternatively, 
future work could use the current method but with a different ingroup disaster and examine 
whether it produces similar ingroup infrahumanization. In a related vein, future work could 
also examine the impact of American citizens helping victims of hurricane Katrina (e.g. 
ingroup helps ingroup). This could be contrasted with the impact of news of the outgroup 
helping each other (e.g. outgroup to outgroup help) following a disaster. In light of our 
findings, perhaps this would render participants to humanize the ingroup if they hear that the 
victims of hurricane Katrina received aid from fellow Americans. 





Infrahumanizing the Outgroup. When American participants read about a Pakistani 
disaster, irrespective of whether aid was given by Americans to Pakistanis, participants did 
not show any increase in the secondary emotions attributed to Pakistanis. My subtle 
infrahumanization findings (but perhaps not my blatant ascent findings) are inconsistent with 
Saguy and colleagues (2015) who found that having participants read about the ingroup 
helping outgroup members lead to more blatant humanizing perceptions of the outgroup.  
The current work suggests that news of an outgroup disaster, regardless of hearing 
about the ingroup giving them aid, may (subtly) backfire and perpetuate infrahumanization of 
the outgroup that was helped. Because of the limitations that I address in the subsequent 
sections, caution must be taken when interpreting this discrepancy. When there was no 
mention of aid, news of a Pakistani disaster lead to infrahumanization of Pakistanis. 
However, when participants read about the Pakistan floods and America giving increasingly 
larger amounts of aid, infrahumanization remained unchanged.  
There are, however, four notable differences between Saguy and colleagues (2015) 
and the current work. Firstly, I examined both blatant and subtle dehumanization, whereas 
Saguy et al (2015) measured only blatant dehumanization. Secondly, I examined 
infrahumanization of the ingroup (which offers a more nuanced look at rehumanization 
strategies), whereas Saguy et al (2015) did not. Thirdly, Saguy and colleagues (2015) 
examined ingroup to outgroup aid during a human-caused disaster (i.e. the Israeli-Palestine 
conflict), whereas the current work examined ingroup to outgroup aid following a natural 
disaster (i.e. the Pakistan floods). Finally, the current findings were not examined in the 
context of intergroup violence and, as the authors discuss, the benefits of intergroup aid may 
be less pronounced in a non-violent intergroup context  (Saguy, et al., 2015, p. 5). This may 





ingroup’s act of kindness towards the outgroup, and may unfortunately lead to feelings of 
power over the outgroup that was helped (Civile and Obhi, 2015). 
Humanizing the Ingroup. Our mixed findings between subtle and blatant measures 
of the outgroup become less ambiguous when taken alongside our finding that those same 
participants humanized the ingroup when reading about an outgroup disaster. Again, this 
suggests that our prime may have had an impact on both outgroup and ingroup perceptions. 
When Americans read about the Pakistan floods, they attributed more secondary 
emotions to the ingroup, compared to primary emotions, regardless of whether America gave 
Pakistan aid or not. Because this effect was found in the control condition as well, this may 
imply that news of an outgroup experiencing a disaster, regardless of whether the ingroup 
helped them, may perpetuate the subtle ingroup favouritism of greater attributions of 
secondary emotions compared to primary emotions to the ingroup (recall this was the effect 
that was alleviated after reading about hurricane Katrina). 
Taken together, the current work supports the small body of experimental work which 
has begun to outline the parameters for successful rehumanization. What is becoming 
apparent for the process of rehumanization to occur is that there ought to be information 
which recalibrates people’s moral compass to reconsider their perspective of the 
dehumanized target. Previous work has shown that this information can be derived from 
imagining positive interactions with the outgroup (Vezzali et al., 2012); complex descriptions 
of the outgroup’s identity (Albarello & Rubini, 2012; Prati, Vasiljevic, Crisp, & Rubini 
2015); knowledge of the out group’s achievements and intentions (Bernard et al., 2015); and 
finally, manipulating the participants state feelings of power (Civile & Obhi, 2015). Indeed, 
the current findings fit the existing literature by providing an additional circumstance in 





An interesting theoretical question raised by the current work is whether or not the 
current findings would replicate with financial disasters. Following the recent financial crisis 
that erupted in 2007, there has been international negative press about how incapable certain 
countries are at managing their finances, including America and several European countries 
(e.g. the PIIGS nations: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) (e.g. Buiter, 2007). Future 
work could explore whether the current findings would replicate to news of intergroup 
financial aid following financial disasters.  
Broader implications 
The current findings have several real world implications. It may be that having more 
media and discussion surrounding the ingroup receiving help following natural disasters 
could lead to a reduction in intergroup bias via perceiving outgroups as more human and 
perhaps similar to the ingroup. In the particular context of the national response to hurricane 
Katrina, this notion is rather interesting. There is a fair amount of press surrounding the 
government’s failure to a) act, and b) accept help from other countries. Perhaps the failure to 
accept outgroup help following natural disasters has a nuanced political undertone. 
Additionally, the current work suggests that media portrayals of foreign victims of natural 
disasters may actually perpetuate intergroup bias. For example, in attempt to rationalize why 
these things are happening to these people and perhaps why no one is helping them. One way 
to rationalize their suffering is to minimize it, and the best way to do that, is to dehumanize 
them.  
Limitations and Future Research 
There are several limitations of the current study which suggest caution should be 
taken when interpreting the findings of this study. 
Participants. Firstly, the sample of participants I used may be of concern. I used an 





has its merits, including a wide variety of individuals from an array of backgrounds, it also 
has its downfalls. Specifically, as the entire study is completed online, I had no control over 
who conducted the study or the conditions under which they did the experiment. However, 
recent work suggests that MTurk participants may be more attentive to the study than typical 
university student samples (Ramsey, Thompson, McKenzie & Rosenbaum, 2016). 
Additionally, as participants get paid for completion of the study, some participants race 
through the experiment and may not have taken care reading the manipulation or answering 
the dependent measures honestly. In order to combat these challenges, I used a manipulation 
check and reverse coded the items of our animalistic dehumanization measure. However, the 
infrahumanization and ascent measure could not be reverse coded due to the nature of the 
measure. What’s more, I found both ceiling and floor effects in my data which may represent 
those participants who raced through the experiment without paying attention. Future work 
may benefit from employing a different means of sampling to replicate the current findings. 
Measures. Future work could benefit from recording mechanistic dehumanization as 
the current work chose to focus on only animalistic dehumanization of Pakistanis because of 
their proximity with the Middle East and some westerners association of the Middle East with 
backwardness (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). Secondly, as some items in the 
animalistic dehumanization scale I used make a Western world versus the rest comparison 
(with the West setting the norm), future research could also examine the current paradigm 
with two western countries, where the ingroup is compared to a western outgroup. 
Additionally, future work will also benefit from examining potential moderating variables 
within the current paradigm. As dehumanization and rehumanization are both related to 
hierarchical thinking, moderating variables such as social dominance orientation and the 






The current research examined a way to increase the humanity attributed to a 
previously dehumanized outgroup. The current findings raise intriguing questions about 
dehumanization and intergroup relations. Overall, participants infrahumanized the victims of 
a disaster, regardless of whether the target was in the ingroup or the outgroup. In addition, 
participants attributed more humanity to the target that was giving aid, regardless of whether 
they were ingroup members or outgroup members. 
That is, American participants who read about Pakistan sending (small or large) aid to 
the victims of hurricane Katrina attributed significantly more secondary (human) emotions to 
Pakistanis, compared to participants who read about hurricane Katrina and no mention of aid. 
Interestingly, participants who read about hurricane Katrina, regardless of whether aid was 
mentioned, infrahumanized the ingroup. These findings suggest that (1) news of hurricane 
Katrina with no mention of aid may alleviate ingroup (national)favouritism via a reduction in 
secondary emotions attributed to Americans in general, and that (2) news of Pakistanis 
helping Americans may alleviate both the ingroup favouritism and outgroup bias associated 
with infrahumanization.  
In addition, those participants who read about the Pakistan floods, regardless of 
reading about ingroup to outgroup aid, showed the classic infrahumanization effect of more 
secondary emotions relative to primary emotions attributed to the ingroup, and no such 
difference in attributions of outgroup emotions. These findings suggest that news of an 
outgroup disaster, regardless of whether the victims are helped by the ingroup, may, at least 
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Pakistan floods control: You will now be shown a news article about a natural disaster. You 
will then be asked a series of broad questions before being asked directly about what you 
read. Please take your time reading this article. Only move on from this page when you feel 
you will be able to answer questions about what you have read. 
2010 flood: the costliest and one of the deadliest to strike Pakistan 
The 2010 flood was an extraordinarily powerful and deadly flood that carved a wide swath of 
catastrophic damage and inflicted large loss of life. According to the meteorological 
department, rainfall of 8 inches was recorded in the Province of Sindh. On July 31st, 20% of 
Pakistan was flooded with some parts up to 15 feet under water; one million homes to 
millions of people were directly affected by the hurricane resulting in thousands of injuries 
and the deaths of more than 1000 persons. 
Hurricane Katrina control: You will now be shown a news article about a natural disaster. 
You will then be asked a series of broad questions before being asked directly about what you 
read. Please take your time reading this article. Only move on from this page when you feel 
you will be able to answer questions about what you have read. 
Katrina: the costliest and one of the deadliest hurricanes to ever strike the United States 
Hurricane Katrina was an extraordinarily powerful and deadly hurricane that carved a wide 
swath of catastrophic damage and inflicted large loss of life. On August 31st, 80% of New 
Orleans was flooded with some parts up to 15 feet under water. The storm itself did a great 
deal of damage, but its aftermath was catastrophic; over 250,000 homes to more than one 
million people were directly affected by the hurricane resulting in hundreds of injuries and 
the deaths of more than 1000 persons. 





America was one of the countries to offer assistance to the victims of the 2010 Pakistan 
flood. American medical professionals established the Sindh Response Task Force as a 
gesture of solidarity and sympathy with the people of Pakistan. The task force is an 
independent, non-governmental initiative connecting 6 volunteer American doctors and 
nurses with Pakistani children needing medical attention. US aid to Pakistan following the 
flooding totalled US$10 million (1% of the US humanitarian budget). Furthermore, everyday 
citizens in the US donated an additional US $500,000 toward relief efforts in Pakistan. 
US aid to Pakistan high aid: America sends aid to Pakistan following devastating flood 
America was one of the first countries to offer assistance to the victims of the 2010 Pakistan 
flood. American medical professionals from various states established the Sindh Response 
Task Force as a gesture of solidarity and sympathy with the people of Pakistan. The task 
force is an independent, non-governmental initiative that connected over 60 American 
volunteer doctors and nurses with Pakistani children needing medical attention. US aid to 
Pakistan following the flooding totalled over US$200 million (20% of the US humanitarian 
budget). Furthermore, everyday citizens in the US donated an additional US$25,000,000 
toward relief efforts in Pakistan. 
Pakistan aid to US low aid: Pakistan sends aid to US following devastating Katrina 
Pakistan was one of the countries to offer assistance to the victims of hurricane Katrina. 
Pakistani medical professionals established the Katrina Response Task Force as a gesture of 
solidarity and sympathy with the people of the United States. The task force is an 
independent, non-governmental initiative connecting 6 volunteer Pakistani doctors and nurses 
with American children needing medical attention. Pakistani aid to the US following Katrina 





citizens in Pakistan donated an additional US$50,000 toward relief efforts following in the 
US. 
Pakistan aid to US high aid: Pakistan sends aid to US following devastating Katrina 
Pakistan was one of the first countries to offer assistance to the victims of hurricane Katrina. 
Pakistani medical professionals from all around Pakistan established the Katrina Response 
Task Force as a gesture of solidarity and sympathy with the people of the United States. The 
task force is an independent, non-governmental initiative that connected over 60 volunteer 
Pakistani doctors and nurses with American children needing medical attention. Pakistani aid 
to the US following Katrina totalled over US$10 million (20% of the Pakistan humanitarian 
budget). Furthermore, everyday citizens in Pakistan donated an addition US$500,000 toward 
















Animalistic dehumanization scale from Leidner et al (2010). Note: only the first four items 
were used for the pilot. All items were used in the main study: 
“For the next few questions indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statements about XXX. Try not to think too hard about your answer – the first that comes to 
mind is often best.” 
"Some aspects of XXX life are typical of a backward culture." 
"XXX culture is as highly developed as most cultures." 
"XXX has still much to learn from Western countries." 
"Compared to other populations, XXX are..." (from 1 = less civilized, to 9 = more civilized) 
"Do you agree with anthropologists suggesting that the XXX way of life denotes a somewhat 
lower level of evolutionary development?" 
"It is very easy to endorse the values of XXX." 
"Compared to Westerners, moral values are less likely to be developed among XXX." 
"Compared to Westerners, moral values are less likely to be taught to XXX children." 
 
Mechanistic dehumanization scale used in pilot study (from Bastian and Haslam , 2010): 
“For the next few questions indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statements about XXX. Try not to think too hard about your answer – the first that comes to 
mind is often best.” 





“Are emotional, responsive and warm..” 
“Have depth.” 
























‘Ascent of man’ figure from Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, (2015) used in both Pilot 




















Means and standard deviations of infrahumanization (subtle dehumanization). This includes secondary and 
primary emotions attributed to both the ingroup and the outgroup, in both the hurricane Katrina and the Pakistan 
floods conditions. 
   Condition   
Disaster Target Emotion 
type 







Pakistanis secondary 2.23 (.93) 2.70 (.86) 2.67 (.76) (2,121) =4.03 .02* 
primary 2.17 (1.05) 2.04 (.88) 2.27 (.98) (2,121)=.60 .55 
Americans secondary 3.48 (.79) 3.38 (.86) 3.57 (.88) (2,121) =1.16 .32^ 
primary 3.65 (.83) 3.37 (.91) 3.59 (1.03) -  
Pakistan 
floods 
Pakistanis secondary 3.73 (.91) 3.61 (.68) 3.79 (.69) (2, 136)=5.82 .56^ 
primary 3.85 (1.21) 4.05 (.88) 4.01 (.81) -  
Americans secondary 2.55 (.97) 2.58 (.52) 2.63 (.85) -  
primary 2.04 (1.13) 2.19 (.89) 2.13 (.94) -  
Note: ^ denote non-significant interactions (2-way and 3-way respectively) which correspond to more than one 
row of means. Higher numbers indicate a greater attribution of emotions.  
 
Table 3. 
Means and standard deviations of the blatant dehumanization of both Pakistanis and Americans, in both the 
hurricane Katrina and the Pakistan floods conditions. 
   Condition   








Pakistanis animalistic 3.87 (.89) 3.61 (1.05) 3.45 (1.09) (1,257
) = .33 
.72^ 
 ascent 88.93 (17.58) 91.53 (12.83) 90.02 (18.11) (2,257
) = .32 
.73^ 
Americans ascent 92.58 (11.68) 94.13 (12.10) 93.68 (16.69) (2,257




Pakistanis animalistic 4.09 (1.16) 3.86 (1.08) 3.91 (1.13) -  
 ascent 82.69 (24.64) 84.78 (23.24) 87.69 (18.61) -  
Americans ascent 93.33 (12.01) 92.91 (15.03) 90.89 (17.19) -  
Note: ^Each interaction was non-significant. The significance statistics correspond to 2-way interactions of 
disaster origin (e.g. hurricane Katrina vs Pakistan floods) x amount of aid (control vs small vs large) on each 
dependent variable. 
 
